[women-rights] Uganda: Operation Iron Fist likely to increase violence against women

DIGITAL FREEDOM NETWORK: Human rights and cyber-rights news

Operation Iron Fist likely to increase violence against women and girls
by Shravanti Reddy, Digital Freedom Network

URL: www.dfn.org/news/uganda/iron-fist.htm

(December 5, 2002) The decision last month to extend Operation Iron Fist 
into 2003 is more likely to subject women and girls in Northern Uganda to 
further violence than bring peace to the region.

As the UPDF entered Southern Sudan, the LRA fled into Northern Uganda, 
slaughtering and raping many Ugandans on the way.

In March, the Ugandan government obtained approval from the Sudanese 
government to launch a military offensive against the Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA), whose bases are located in southern Sudan.

A rebel group led by Joseph Kony, the LRA has fought for control of Uganda 
from the current government under Yoweri Museveni since 1986 in order to 
establish biblical rule based on the Ten Commandments.

Far from observing basic religious tenets, the LRA has been responsible for 
ongoing attacks against the civilian population in Northern Uganda that 
involve massive human rights violations. The result has been the 
displacement of an estimated 500,000 people and the abduction of 12,000 
children.

The prevalence of gender-based violence against women and girls throughout 
the conflict has been a cause for concern. Displacement and abduction has 
made women and girls more vulnerable to human rights violations and 
gender-based violence such as rape, sexual slavery, and physical abuse.

Thus far, Operation Iron Fist has failed to reach its stated objectives of 
ending LRA attacks against civilian populations and obtaining the release 
of abducted children. Rather, the number of LRA attacks and child 
abductions have actually increased since the launch of Operation Iron Fist.

Despite this outcome, the Sudanese government has agreed to extend the 
Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) access to southern Sudanese locations 
for an additional two months. This will allow Operation Iron Fist to 
continue until the end of January, 2003.

Many believe that Operation Iron Fist will not only fail to achieve its 
goals by January, but will also cause further displacement and abductions 
of civilians during the process.

In addition, mixed reports have surfaced concerning the Sudanese 
government's possible renewed support for the LRA, making peace in the 
region more unlikely without urgent intervention by the international 
community.


Operation Iron Fist

The decision to enter Southern Sudan to eliminate bases used by the LRA to 
launch attacks into Northern Uganda may seem like a prudent plan. However 
by most accounts, Operation Iron Fist has been a failure.

Prior to a 1999 peace accord between Uganda and Sudan, the Sudanese 
government had provided the LRA with military and financial support—as well 
as refuge within southern Sudan—in retaliation for the Ugandan government's 
support of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), a Sudanese rebel 
group.

The peace accord ended support for rebel activities by both governments, 
and paved the way for a protocol between the two governments in March 
allowing the UPDF entry into Southern Sudan in order to root out the LRA 
and release abducted children. In the past, the LRA has also attacked 
Sudanese civilians living in southern Sudan, as well as Sudanese refugees 
in Northern Uganda.

While the Ugandan government has committed a large number of troops to 
Operation Iron Fist, it has left Northern Uganda inadequately protected 
from LRA attacks.

The Ugandan government is determined to continue Operation Iron Fist 
despite the gruesome results.

LRA troops driven by the UPDF from Southern Sudan re-entered Northern 
Uganda where they began a series of violent attacks against unarmed 
civilians mainly in the provinces of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader, many living 
within refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps.

Since June, the LRA has attacked the Acholi-Pii and Maaji refugee camps, 
the Pabo IDP camp, as well as many villages and communities within the 
region. These attacks have resulted in gruesome deaths, abductions and the 
wide-scale displacement of refugees and IDPs. In the attack on Acholi-Pii 
alone, an estimated 24,000 people were displaced while the Pabo camp attack 
resulted in the abduction of six teenage girls.

Despite these results, the Ugandan government has remained determined to 
persevere with Operation Iron Fist, but has not provided any additional 
measures to protect civilians in Northern Uganda.


Displacement and abductions lead to gender-based violence for women and girls

Women and girls who are displaced or abducted are more likely to become 
victims of gender-based violence.

While boys are often abducted by the LRA to carry loot or to be trained as 
child soldiers, girls face an even worse fate. When a girl is abducted and 
held in captivity by the LRA she is most likely forced to carry loot and 
act as a laborer, usually cooking and cleaning for the rebel soldiers. She 
might also be forced to become a child soldier, killing against her will. 
But she will almost definitely become a victim of sexual abuse and 
violence, most likely raped and forced to serve as a sexual slave to an LRA 
soldier. Those who try to resist are usually beaten or killed.

Many become pregnant and give birth to children during their captivity. In 
fact, the inability to move quickly with a small child is one of the main 
reasons why fewer girls have escaped from LRA captivity as compared to boys.

Those who do manage to escape, or are released from captivity, often bear 
lifelong scars. It is estimated that over 50% are infected with the HIV 
virus and close to 100% contract an STI (Sexually Transmitted Infection) as 
a result of sexual abuse during their captivity. They also suffer from 
psychological trauma and fear of re-abduction.

The Ugandan "protected camps" set up for refugees are rife with poverty, 
disease, and sexual abuse.

In fact, fear of abduction and escape from LRA attacks is one of the main 
reasons for the massive population displacement in Northern Uganda. A 
government policy to relocate the population into "protected camps" guarded 
by the UPDF is the other.

Overcrowded and lacking many basic social services, these "protected camps" 
have resuted in wide-spread disease and poverty, rather than protection 
from the LRA. The close quarters and insecurity within the camps has led to 
the sexual abuse of women and girls by male residents living within the 
camps, attacking LRA forces, and even the UPDF forces tasked with 
protecting them. Rape, teen sex and pregnancy have flourished in this 
environment.


Return without rehabilitation

There is little assistance and support for victims of gender-based violence 
in Uganda.

Although the Ugandan government established the Amnesty Commission to carry 
out reintegration and rehabilitation programs for abducted children, the 
agency is chronically under-funded with little political will behind its 
mandate. Most abducted children have not received reintegration packages 
and it is doubtful that specific programs for women and girls exist.

Instead, women and girls must rely on services provided at reception 
centers run by local and international NGOs. However, these centers are 
also under-funded and currently overwhelmed with the estimated 500 women 
and children that have "escaped or been released, rescued or captured from 
the LRA since June." The majority were left behind because they were too 
slow, weak, or sick to keep up with the LRA forces fleeing the UPDF in 
southern Sudan.

While such centers can provide reintegration assistance, psychosocial 
support, vocational training, health referrals, and family tracing 
services, there are few programs that target the special needs of child 
mothers who are less prepared to support themselves and their children 
because they lacked access to educational or vocational services while in 
captivity.

The situation for IDPs is not much better. Although a Draft National IDP 
policy was circulated by the government in April, there is little hope that 
the government will provide adequate funding for the needs of IDPs, let 
alone for their return and reintegration into their communities. Most 
likely, they will continue to rely on international humanitarian agencies.


An end to violence requires political will

The fact that the conflict has been allowed to drag on for sixteen years 
clearly shows a lack of political will to create a lasting peace in 
Northern Uganda.

In addition to extending Operation Iron Fist, the Ugandan army has 
announced an $11,000 reward for any information on the whereabouts of LRA 
leader Joseph Kony, as well as other top LRA commanders. At the same time, 
they claim they will uphold an amnesty offer made to the rebels three years 
ago. The LRA, for their part, have continued their attacks.

Without improving protection in Northern Uganda, Operation Iron Fist will 
not only cause more harm to civilians, but it will also take money away 
from sorely needed social services and programs for victims.
Prospects for an end to the violence remain slim without the intervention 
of the international community which seems necessary to bring both parties 
to the negotiating table.

The need for intervention is heightened by reports the Sudanese government 
is once again supporting the LRA. The Sudanese government has denied such 
claims, instead accusing the SPLA of supporting the LRA. The SPLA has 
likewise denied these accusations and pointed their finger once again at 
the Sudanese government.

While it is still unclear if there is any truth to these allegations, such 
reports may break down the commitment made by both the Ugandan and Sudanese 
governments in 1999 to refrain from supporting the SPLA and LRA, respectively.

If the agreement does break down, then peace may be further down the road 
then we imagine.


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