huridocs-tech Wire tapping and Internet telephony

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## author     : declan@well.com
## date       : 25.10.99
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http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,32100,00.html

                     'Don't Help the Snoops' by Declan
                     McCullagh

                     10:45 a.m. 25.Oct.99.PDT The Internet's
                     standards body should not craft
                     technology to aid government
                     surveillance, a prominent conservative
                     congressman says.

                     Representative Bob Barr (R-Georgia)
                     said that there is no reason for the
                     Internet Engineering Task Force to
                     support wiretapping in the next
                     generation of protocols and that doing
                     so would be "dangerous."

                     "For the sake of protecting freedom,
                     commerce, and privacy on the Internet,
                     I urge you to draw the line firmly and
                     early, by immediately rejecting any
                     attempts to force a cumbersome,
                     expensive, and dangerous surveillance
                     architecture on the Internet," Barr
                     wrote in a letter to IETF chairman Fred
                     Baker.

                     [...]


X-UIDL: e01ccfdce0d5ae70bcbce2f7dd24b8d6

October 25, 1999

Mr. Fred Baker
IETF Secretariat
C/o Corporation for National Research Initiatives
1895 Preston White Drive
Suite 100
Reston, Virginia  20191-5434

IN RE: Wiretapping and Internet Telephony

Dear Mr. Baker:

In light of the fact that the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) has become involved in the Communications
Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) compliance debate,
I write to urge your strong opposition to any effort to
force a surveillance-friendly architecture on the Internet.
There are several reasons why opposition to such efforts is
critical.

When CALEA was enacted in 1994, law enforcement officials
assured Congress its only effect would be to maintain the
wiretapping status quo.  Since then, the same officials have
used every opportunity to pressure telecommunications
companies to create unprecedented monitoring capabilities
going far beyond the status quo, CALEA's mandates, the
intent of Congress, and the Fourth Amendment.  Even worse,
the telecommunications companies have been forced to either
pass these costs along to their customers or contest law
enforcement's demands in court.

In my opinion, Internet telephony in its current form falls
far short of the statutory definitions in CALEA.
Furthermore, based on Congress's intent to do nothing more
than maintain the status quo by enacting CALEA, it is
questionable whether Internet telephony could ever be
appropriately included under the Act's mandates.    Of
course, this fact will not put an end to demands by law
enforcement and regulators that Internet service providers
and telecommunications companies make their jobs easier by
wiretapping the Internet for them.

If you encourage such steps, several things will happen.
First, network and software creators will begin building
flaws into products in order to create back doors for law
enforcement.  In the process, the security that serves as a
prerequisite and incentive for electronic commerce and
communication will be threatened.  As hackers demonstrate
with frightening regularity, practically no system is fully
secure.  Building intentional flaws into systems will expose
them to criminal abuse and unconstitutional monitoring.

Secondly, an initial demand for limited access to Internet
telephone calls will soon expand into an ever-increasing
demand for access to all voice communications, followed by a
demand for access to e-mail and data traffic. If the IETF
gets in the business of trying to anticipate what the
government might demand, government agencies will thank you
for your efforts, and promptly issue more demands.  It is a
virtual certainty the government's demands will exceed the
private sector's willingness and ability to comply with
them.  The only real question is precisely when that point
will be reached.

Finally, Internet-based companies will be forced to pass
compliance and legal costs along to their customers.  In a
sector where cost-competitiveness is critical, compliance
costs could bring the development of exciting new Internet
telephony products and services to a virtual standstill.
Similar effects could also be felt on practically every
Internet company, if surveillance mandates are expanded
beyond telephony.

For the sake of protecting freedom, commerce, and privacy on
the Internet, I urge you to draw the line firmly and early,
by immediately rejecting any attempts to force a cumbersome,
expensive, and dangerous surveillance architecture on the
Internet.   If you arrive at the conclusion further legal
protections are needed to ensure a massive wiretapping
structure is not imposed on the Internet, I would welcome
the opportunity to discuss how best to enact them.

With kind regards, I am,

very truly yours,


BOB BARR
Member of Congress




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