[hr-education] Re: The role of self-interest

(from the Oxford English Dictionary: Self-interest: a private or personal
end; regard to or pursuit of one's own advantage or welfare esp. to the
exclusion of regard for others. Hence self - interested: actuated solely
by regard for one's personal advantage or welfare)

I'm going to try to answer some of Jim Uhlenkamp's questions and
objections (July 5). In brief, the 'pragmatic' point that I referred to is
simply that what is in my self-interest and what is right from the human
rights point of view do not always coincide ­ and I have given some
illustrations of this further on in my response. For this reason, using
self-interest criteria will not always lead to the 'right' thing to do
from a moral point of view ­ and it is therefore not an effective way of
teaching children about human rights. I would go further, and say that my
self-interest should never actually be a consideration in determining the
moral status of an act, and that is, if you like, my 'ideological' point.
I think the two are conceptually separate ­ which explains why they will,
at least sometimes, lead to different conclusions.

The rest of my response is fairly lengthy, and people may want to skip to
the end, where I put another question, on which I'd very much appreciate
some honest feedback! The substance of my (lengthy) comments attempts to
set out the two points (above) in more detail, as well as touching on one
or two other questions raised by Jim and others ­ such as motivation for
actions, our role as educators (/indoctrinators?) and the idea of
extending the range of our interests to include 'more and more of the
moral universe' (Martha Maas on 6 July).

Let me start with that very point. I should thank Martha for a useful
clarification, which pointed up, at least for me, a slightly different
understanding of the term self-interest by various members of the list.
I've put the (shorter) OED definition at the head of this message! Martha
questions whether there is indeed a dichotomy between self-interest and
altruism / moral values. I wholly take her point ­ and actually agree with
her - that what is important is the extent of the boundaries that limit an
individual's 'interests' but I am still uneasy about using the term
self-interest in this context - even, as my quotation marks imply - about
the applicability of the term 'interests' at all. I would prefer to talk
about priorities, values, or moral standpoint. Interests are too pragmatic
­ value-free - and (too) self-centred; and these are not concepts that for
me are intrinsic to moral values. They are too pragmatic because they are
defined by what is good (healthy/profitable/enjoyable - etc) for the
person in question, and take no account of the effect on others. And they
are too self-centred even in the extreme case where the world at the
centre of which 'I' lie includes every individual: for why, after all,
should it be 'me' at the centre rather than you... or you... or him? Yes ­
we want people to do what's right because they want to; but, again, I
don't think that self-interest is the right word to apply in this context.

'Selflessness' seems closer to the mark. For surely what we want people to
want is not ­ above all ­ that their own interests should be protected
(irrespective of those of others); but rather that no one individual's
interests are harmed ­ within certain limits ­ irrespective of who that
individual is. Putting oneself on a level with everyone else and not above
them.

Is that not fundamental to human rights 'ideology'? That all human beings
are equal, on a level, equally important, equally entitled to the
fundamental rights? How can acting out of self-interest ­ where that is
understood to mean acting to fulfil one's own purpose (and therefore ­ not
that of others, where these conflict) have a place within that ideology?
One puts me above others; the other puts me equal to others. That's my
ideological problem with self-interest as a route to human rights.

So now let me turn to pragmatics. Here there are a number of points to be
made. The first, which I have already mentioned, is that my own interest
is simply not a good test, in many everyday cases, of whether someone's
rights are being infringed ­ so to teach children to act according to this
benchmark will not lead them to take even the 'right' decisions (let alone
for the 'right' reasons!). The two simply do not always coincide ­ and
that should not surprise us at all if we accept the incompatibility of the
self-interest and the human rights model - the 'ideological' point that I
have tried to outline above.

Let us look at some examples. It is not obviously in my self-interest to
concern myself with people on death row, nor to campaign about human
rights infringements: it occupies precious time, and may get me in trouble
with the government. It is not in my self-interest to hand in the purse I
find lying on the street, nor to declare a $500 cash gift to the Inland
Revenue, nor to refrain from unprotected sex when I have little time left
to live myself, nor to employ a member of a racial minority in my firm,
when I know that that is likely to be off-putting to my customers.  And,
conversely, it may well be in my self-interest to order the destruction of
a few more rain forests in some distant part of the globe, or to dispose
of 20 years' of accumulated junk in the garden of the house I am about to
vacate, or to bear false witness when there is no one who could prove that
I had done so, or - to take a slightly more rarified example, but one
which has much more serious consequences in terms of human rights - to
join a firing squad when ordered to by ruthless superior. And even if we
believe ­ as I do not ­ that in the end, conscience would torment the
perpetrator of every act outlined above, then that would be, in my view,
an unjustifiably wide use of the term 'self-interest'. It is simply not
what we use the term to mean.

A second pragmatic point. Despite my purist stance, I do occasionally ­ I
confess! ­ find myself using 'self-interest' arguments in classes: 'you
wouldn't be very happy if you did that'...'you could get into serious
trouble'...'someone might do it back to you' etc. But I try to use these
type of arguments only to reinforce a position that has already been
justified from a moral point of view. These arguments cannot themselves
justify, but they provide an added 'disincentive' for students in whom the
principled point of view is not compelling.

So perhaps, in practice, it doesn't really matter! Am I simply being
purist? Perhaps the purist position is not only rather self-indulgent, but
is also - as I suspect Jim Uhlenkamp was suggesting ­ relatively
ineffectual when it actually comes to the classroom. The cases, after all,
do not frequently conflict, and we cannot hope to create a world of
selfless beings, just as we cannot hope to build a world where everyone is
absolutely equal. So should we, as educators, attempt the task which is
realisable but will not lead to perfect results, rather than aiming for a
perfection which we know we cannot achieve?

If that is the argument ­ then what a limited and depressing view of human
nature and of education it offers us! Is it really not possible that our
students should come to see others as equal to themselves; and is it
really not possible that we ­ adults, educators ­ should play an important
part in that process of persuasion and elucidation? With our own children,
do we leave it to 'chance' whether they develop a view of mankind and
morality closer to Mahatma Gandhi's than to Hitler's? We most certainly do
not: we are conscious all the time of the example we set or of the values
they pick up from us in chance remarks, and we are mostly concerned to
explain to them and justify things that seem 'unfair' - precisely because
we know that all of this goes towards shaping the world view they will
come to adopt (in the way that we want it to be shaped!) 'Indoctrinators'
we certainly are, as parents, and we can have all too much influence on
our children's actions and motivations.

So too ­ like it or not ­ can we, and do we, as teachers. And even
refraining altogether from values education ­ from commenting, judging,
correcting or commending children's actions ­ sends a strong message, and
is as formative an influence, I believe, as is actively seeking to shape
their motivations.

Yes ­ we need to be very careful. But is it anyway 'indoctrination', as
Jim suggests? Should we be ashamed of what we do ­ pretend we are not
doing it and hide behind something less controversial ­ people's
interests, for example? I think not, and I think I can persuade myself
that we should not ­ rationally - but I do confess to being troubled by
this problem, constantly. Indoctrination, I think, is when you force the
arguments for one side down people's throats, and don't let them see the
others. I tell myself I am not doing that ­ that I want my children to
'choose' ­ because only then will they come to 'own' the right decision,
and for the right reasons.

But I'm not sure that I do argue the other cases as convincingly as I do
the case for human rights (I find it very difficult!). In any case ­ if I
am honest ­ I see human rights as more than just 'one choice among
others'. We don't talk about 'indoctrinating' children in Newton's laws of
motion, or in Copernicus' sun-centred view of our planetary system. We
talk about 'indoctrination' only when the 'theory' is open to question ­
and when it still qualifies as a theory. For me ­ treating others as you
would yourself is not a theory, it is a must ­ at least given our current
system of morality. Without it ­ that system breaks down; and I, for one,
have not (yet) been shown a satisfactory replacement. A 'Galilean' view of
morality ­ which puts me at the centre of the universe is not, for me,
even a theory.

Any comments on my morally imperialistic stance, which I fear may have
shocked some readers! But can we be both human rights educators, and, at
the same time 'relativists' when it comes to moral values???

Ellie




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